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Introduction 
Events across Europe and North Africa retroactively packaged as the 2015 
‘Mediterranean migration crisis’ saw the greatest number of displaced persons as a 
result of violent conflict in international politics since the dissolution of the former 
Yugoslavia. By the end of December 2015, it is estimated by the United Nations High 
Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) that 1,007,716 migrants and refugees – primarily 
Syrian (49%), Afghan (21%) and Iraq (8%) nationals – arrived ‘irregularly’1 via boats 
in southern Europe – particularly Greece (851,319), Italy (152,700), Spain (3,592), 
and Malta (105) – and a further 34,000 are believed to have crossed from Turkey into 
Bulgaria and Greece by land (UNHCR 2015). Despite a raft of policy interventions 
under the ‘European Migration Agenda’ the UNHCR estimates a further 182,831 
arrivals by sea during the first four months of 2016 (UNHCR 2016). 
In 2015, more than 3,771 ‘irregular’ migrants and refugees are known to have 
died or remain missing in the Mediterranean Sea; a further 1,261 were lost as of April 
2016 (UNHCR 2015, 2016). The greatest number of deaths in the context of a single 
incident on the Mediterranean came on Saturday 18 April 2015 when an overcrowded 
vessel – abandoned by suspected traffickers – overturned in Libyan waters 
approximately 180 kilometers south of the Italian island of Lampedusa: of more than 
700 passengers aboard 50 are reported to have survived (UNHCR 2015). Lampedusa 
was itself the site of two similar incidents in 2013, which saw the deaths of at least 
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600 Eritrean and Somali nationals who on both occasions struggled to swim the 800 
meter distance to the shoreline of the outcrop of Conigli (BBC News 2013a, 2013b).  
 Among elite responses to Europe’s crisis in early 2015 was a call from the 
former Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott2 for EU leaders to adopt an 
Australian-style approach to the issue. In Europe to mark the centenary of the 
Gallipoli landings, Abbott said: ‘The most compassionate thing you can do is to stop 
the boats’ (The Guardian 2015a, emphasis added). Since the early 2000s successive 
Australian governments have sought to manage ‘irregular’ migration by exporting the 
border beyond what are conventionally understood to be the territorial limits of the 
state: in 2013 there were 300 boats carrying more than 20,000 ‘irregular’ migrants; in 
2014 there were none (Davies and Orchard 2015). Though ‘Operation Sovereign 
Borders’ was considered to be a ‘success’ by the Abbott administration3, Australian 
citizens are insulated from the violent costs of this policy, which are felt thousands of 
miles away by ‘irregular’ migrants detained (in some cases indefinitely) on remote 
islands and in states with histories of egregious human rights abuses such as 
Cambodia, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam (Chambers 2015; Davies and Orchard 2015; 
Martin 2015; McNevin 2014; Peers 2015; The Guardian 2015a).  
 While EU leaders have not fully embraced Abbott’s rhetoric, the 
Commission’s response to the crisis has been marked by a continued emphasis on 
both tough border security and the language of ‘saving lives’. But there is also a third 
dimension common to both European and Australian contexts – a new focus on 
smuggling and military response – that shifts responsibility for deaths arising from 
‘irregular’ mobility from both migrants and refugees and restrictive border security 
and migration management. There is, for example, a striking similarity between 
Abbott’s exhortation that ‘our determination to save lives at sea’ is greater than 
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people smugglers’ determination to put lives ‘at risk’ and the words of Federica 
Mogherini, the EU Commission’s High Representative and Vice-President, on the 
announcement of the new European Agenda on Migration in May 2015: ‘This is not 
only a European but a global challenge: with this agenda we confirm and broaden our 
cooperation with the countries of origin and transit in order to save lives, clamp down 
on smuggling networks and protect those in need’ (European Commission 2015a, 
emphasis added). In both cases the introduction of the smuggler as a third party has 
created new opportunities for militarised solutions to ‘irregular’ migration under the 
rubric of compassionate borderwork.  
 Recently, several scholars in International Relations (IR) – and the 
interdisciplinary fields of critical border and migration studies – have examined in the 
European context ‘the birth of the humanitarian border’ (Walters 2011), the 
‘victim/saviour’ logic of border policing (Pallister-Wilkins 2015), and the rise of 
‘humanitarianism-light’ (Basaran 2015). Related work in the US-Mexico borderlands 
has investigated humanitarian (Williams 2015) and post-humanitarian (Squire 2015) 
attempts at regulating ‘irregular’ mobility. In turn, much of this work draws on a 
range of Foucaultian-inspired scholarship across the humanities and social sciences 
concerning the performative politics of humanitarian reason (Fassin 2012), regimes of 
care (Feldman and Ticktin 2010), armed love (Ticktin 2011), and protection under 
emergency conditions (Fassin and Pandolfi 2013). However, the former body of work 
focuses on humanitarian bordering in the context of region-specific sites and the 
latter, though often global in scope, pays little attention to the specific entanglement 
of logics of humanitarianism and securitization in the field of border security and 
migration management. Furthermore, neither set of literatures reflects to any great 
extent on the difficulties posed by the cooptation of the discourse of humanitarianism 
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by securitizing actors for critical scholarship in IR when much of that scholarship 
relies precisely upon humanitarian arguments. Despite these advances, both arguably 
fall short of offering an alternative conceptual framework for thought, judgment, and 
action in response to contemporary migration crises.  
In this article we argue that, despite the specificities of geographical, 
historical, and cultural contexts, it is possible to discern the emergence of a 
transnational discourse of compassionate border security, which fuses humanitarian 
and militarised logics – with ambivalent ethical and political effects – and defies 
traditional territorially-based understandings of borders. Working through two case 
studies in the European and Australian contexts, we show how compassionate 
borderwork enacts worlds, creates and delimits political and ethical possibilities, and 
has concrete and often contradictory – if no less violent – effects on the lives of 
targeted populations produced as ‘irregular’. While transnational discourses of 
compassionate border security operate according to a universal and therefore 
purportedly borderless logic of ‘saving lives’, the subjectivity of the ‘irregular’ 
migrant in need of rescue is one that is produced as spatially and temporally 
exceptional – the imperative is always to act in the here and the now – and better 
knowable and therefore governable. By thinking in these terms we can better 
diagnose examples of compassionate bordering today not only as important topical 
issues of the moment, but also as symptomatic of broader governmental logics that 
attempt to simultaneously enhance and save lives biopolitically.  
Locating compassionate borderwork within the biopolitical grid of 
intelligibility – as paradigmatically outlined by Michel Foucault (1998) – allows for a 
mode of critique beyond a reliance on the very forms of humanitarianism that have 
been coopted by transnational governmental actors and logics. However, we argue 
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that the Foucaultian approach only gets critical IR scholarship so far. The concept of 
biopolitics – the attempt to enhance and optimise life at the level of the population – 
explains how humanitarian border security offers opportunities for governing 
‘irregular’ migrants and refugees through succour. But it runs up against its own 
diagnostic limits in the light of the demonstrable capacity for contemporary forms of 
compassionate borderwork to lead to ‘irregular’ migrants’ and refugees’ 
dehumanisation and death. For this reason, we supplement existing Foucaultian 
understandings of humanitarian borderwork with Roberto Esposito’s (2008, 2011) 
treatment of the concept of (auto)immunity in order to argue that the adoption of 
humanitarian and securitizing logics are not contradictory but essentially conjoined 
elements within the field of contemporary border security and migration management. 
 We develop this central argument via four main sections. The first explores a 
series of spatial and temporal (dis)locations of ‘the border’ in both the European and 
Australian contexts. We argue that, despite several important differences between 
them, it is possible to identify key dynamics common to both culminating in recent 
years with the rise of the discourse of humanitarian border security. From here we 
then offer two case studies of how compassion and violence have come to mark 
border and migration management policies and practices in both contexts: elite 
responses to the 2015 Mediterranean migration and refugee crisis and the Gillian 
Triggs episode, respectively. Finally, we conclude with an exploration of the 
implications of our empirical analysis of transnational humanitarian bordering and 
conceptual development of the paradigmatic Foucaultian frame for critical border and 




Spatial and temporal (dis)locations of the border in Europe and Australia 
PM Tony Abbott’s remarks about the need for EU leaders to adopt an Australian-style 
solution to the migration and refugee crisis were tempered by Julie Bishop, his 
Foreign Secretary, who suggested that a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach towards 
migration and border security was inappropriate across diverse geopolitical contexts 
(The Guardian 2015b). Of course, particular historical, geographical, political, legal, 
and cultural features in each context militate against hasty generalisations across the 
policy trajectories and on the ground experiences of both border security personnel 
and ‘irregular’ migrants. This is not least because the nationalities of ‘irregular’ 
migrants and refugees, their motivations for and experiences of (im)mobility, and 
their points of origin and transit routes mean that the politically contested issue of 
‘migration’ is far from universally understood. To take one prominent example of a 
key difference between the EU and Australian contexts, the practice of indefinite 
detention – permitted under Australian law for ‘irregular’ migrants who arrive without 
authorisation – has been banned by the European Court of Human Rights (Peers 
2015).  
In the Australian case, there are particular dynamics that relate to its maritime 
borders and also to its relationship with neighbouring states in the region (Chambers 
2015). Whereas the EU increasingly provides a common platform for Member States 
in addressing border and migration issues collectively, Australia’s relations with its 
neighbours are still conducted through a traditional nation-state paradigm. Thus, when 
the notion of a ‘regional solution’ has sometimes been aired in Australian politics, as 
it was during Julia Gillard’s administration (McKenzie and Hasmath 2013), this has 
always been viewed as a transaction between nation-states in the region. As such, the 
efforts to enlist neighbouring states such as Malaysia and Cambodia to provide long-
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term homes for asylum seekers held in Australian detention camps, has involved 
various enticements and blandishments to these neighbouring states rather than a 
regional agreement about the treatment of asylum seekers per se. Indeed, this rather 
traditional political dynamic has been evident in Australia’s behavior since the 
implementation of Operation Sovereign Borders in September 2013. Border control 
policy has not been focused on addressing the issue of asylum seekers in the region 
but on making sure that resettlement and sanctuary is not Australia’s problem.  
More recently, in response to the exodus of the Rohingya minority from 
Burma in 2015 and the ensuing crisis in the Andaman Sea – with estimates of up to 
7000 people on boats being refused entry to Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia – 
Tony Abbott commented that, ‘I don’t apologise in any way for the action that 
Australia has taken to preserve safety at sea by turning boats around where necessary 
… and if other countries choose to do that, frankly that is almost certainly absolutely 
necessary if the scourge of people smuggling is to be beaten’ (The Guardian 2015c). 
In other words, the response promoted by Abbott to this regional problem was for 
governments of nation-states to unilaterally refuse to permit boat arrivals as to do 
otherwise would be an encouragement to people smugglers. Amid reports of the 
plight of the people stuck in boats in the Andaman Sea, the logic of response from the 
Australian government was one of security and deterrence rather than a humanitarian 
concern for the welfare of the people stuck in limbo until agreement was reached 
between Malaysia and Indonesia to accommodate some boat arrivals and Thailand 
agreed not to turn back boats. This took place at the same time as nations such as the 
USA, the Philippines and Gambia agreed to take in Rohingya asylum seekers while 
Australia refused to do so (The Guardian 2015d). While this example reflects a more 
general turn in the discourse of Australian politics to focus on people smugglers rather 
 8 
than those seeking asylum (McDonald 2011), it also demonstrates the very different 
climate of regional politics within which Australia and the EU operate. When taken 
together with the different geo-political context of solely maritime borders in 
Australia versus maritime and land borders in Europe, it is clear that it would be 
dangerous to suggest that the two cases were like for like.      
 However, despite these differences, we argue that in recent years it is possible 
to identify several ways in which a series of spatial and temporal dislocations of the 
border have come to characterise emerging regimes of border security and migration 
management in both contexts – albeit with differential effects and implications. Here 
our focus is not to ‘compare and contrast’ Europe and Australia as such, but to 
identify and critically interrogate common logics of humanitarian governmentality 
that are increasingly reflected in discourses accompanying the changing nature and 
location of ‘the border’ transnationally.4 We do so by looking in closer detail at three 
core aspects common to both geopolitical contexts: the extra-territorial (and 
increasingly militarised) projection of attempts to control the mobility of ‘irregular’ 
populations (Bialasiewicz 2011; Squire 2011; Author 2 self-reference 2009a); the 
outsourcing of ‘borderwork’ to neighbouring third states (Rumford 2009; Del Sarto 
2015a, 2015b); and the rise of detention as an instrument of border policing 
(Mezzadra and Nielson 2013; McNevin 2015). While these core characteristics have 
been explored at length in each case respectively they have seldom been located in the 
transnational context proposed here and more rarely still have these developments 
been analysed against the backdrop of the accompanying emergence of the discourse 
of compassionate bordering, which we explore in greater detail via two case studies 
in the subsequent section. 
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 Far from a fixed line demarcating the territorial limits of sovereign 
jurisdiction, the nature and location of ‘the border’ is evolving in new and important 
ways in both contexts and this problematises the dominant ‘inside/outside’ frame 
within which a range of theoretical literature produced by the discipline of IR is said 
to operate (Walker 1993). We see prominent moves to ‘off-shore’ diverse bordering 
practices – understood here to refer broadly to a diverse range of attempts to police, 
control, and secure ‘irregular’ mobility – beyond ‘Europe’ and ‘Australia’ such that 
there is a disaggregation between ‘territory’ and ‘the border’ as commonly understood 
in the context of the modern geopolitical imagination (Agnew 2005; Author 2 self 
reference 2009b). In turn, the creation of a global network of biopolitical border 
interventions targeted at the basic needs of ‘irregular’ populations defers and 
displaces European and Australian responsibility for access to asylum and protection 
under international law (Kitagawa 2011).  
 
The European context 
Since the introduction in the early 1990s of strict visa requirements for entry to the 
EU, opportunities for unskilled migrants – particularly Algerian, Moroccan, and 
Tunisian nationals – to travel legally to member states in search of work has been 
choked off (UN, 2013a; Guild and Carrera, 2013). Without the existence of ‘regular’ 
channels open to those seeking employment, an ultimately unknown number of 
migrants have sought to enter the EU during this period via methods and points of 
entry deemed to be ‘irregular’. At the same time, a panoply of enhanced border 
security measures has been posited as the ‘solution’ to the ‘problem’ of ‘irregular’ 
migration in the European context.  
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The lifting of internal border controls among Schengen states in 1985 was 
accompanied by a series of ‘compensatory measures’, which, as seminally noted by 
William Walters (2002), have since developed into a ‘more diffuse, networked, 
control apparatus’ that polices ‘irregularity’ without respecting traditional distinctions 
between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’. The privatisation and militarisation of Europe’s 
borders has been marked, inter alia, by the emergence of the Schengen Information 
System (SIS), the EURODAC database of biometric fingerprints, the Visa 
Information System (VIS), the EU External Border Management Agency FRONTEX, 
the Smart Borders Initiative (SBI), the European Border Surveillance System 
(EUROSUR), and Mobility Partnerships (MPs) with third countries from Azerbaijan 
across North African states to Cape Verde. With these developments European 
bordering practices have undergone a series of spatial and temporal dislocations such 
that it is ultimately unclear where and when Europe’s borders begin and end. If ‘the 
border’ is understood minimally as an attempt to control ‘irregular’ mobility then 
Europe’s borders are increasingly spectral: an apparatus of security that is not always 
successful in its aims, but one that preemptively haunts each and every movement – 
actual and potential – that is deemed to be unauthorised.  
 By now there is a burgeoning academic and activist literature that has 
documented the way in which the off-shoring of EU bordering practices beyond the 
territorial limits of EU Member States has become a hallmark of migration 
management and broader initiatives to performatively secure the external dimension 
of European space (Bialasiewicz, 2011; Geddes 2005; see also Migreurop, 2012). 
These practices are illustrated by the work of FRONTEX whose missions since the 
late 2000s have extended far beyond the Mediterranean Sea into West Africa and 
resemble military operations in all but name (Balibar, 2009; Tazzioli, 2016). Such 
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extra-territorial projections have also gone hand-in-hand with the militarisation of 
European border security. Thus, while FRONTEX has sought to characterise itself as 
a technocratic risk manager and merely a coordinator of Europe’s external borders 
(Neal 2009), its missions—including Operation HERA II in the Canary Islands and 
the West African coastlines—have deployed military equipment supplied by Member 
States in order to mount surveillance operations at sea and on land and are alleged to 
have been involved in illegal ‘push-back’ activities (Carrera 2007; Leonard 2009). 
The militarisation and outward projection of European border security is further 
reflected by the widespread use of satellites, GPS, and other forms of virtual 
communications to gain real-time information about the ‘battlefield’ between border 
security authorities and ‘irregular’ populations. For example, a central concept in the 
justification for the launch in December 2013 of the ‘European Border Surveillance 
System’ (EUROSUR) – a €250 million multi-platform system designed to ‘reinforce 
the control of the Schengen external borders’ (EU Commission 2011c, 1) – is that of 
the ‘pre-frontier area’: ‘the geographical area beyond the external border of the 
member state, which is not covered by a national border surveillance system’ (EU 
Commission 2011c, 9, emphasis added; see also Rijpma and Vermeulen 2015).  
FRONTEX operations and surveillance technologies such as EUROSUR are 
only one aspect of a complex web of networks and practices that project European 
bordering practices outwards among neighbouring third countries designed to export 
control and pre-empt the arrival of ‘irregular’ migrants. Such projections in the 
European context are of course not new and can be viewed as a continuation of 
historic and colonial logics of striating space in order to attempt to control otherwise 
ungovernable subjects overseas long before the establishment of FRONTEX (Jabri 
2012; Kinnvall 2016). However, the reliance upon the outsourcing of borderwork to 
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historically undemocratically elected regimes across North Africa has gathered 
significant momentum particularly since population upheavals since the so-called 
Arab Spring. Via a range of bilateral Mobility Partnerships with countries including 
Cape Verde and Morocco – supported with substantial funding from the EU 
Commission and continuing bilateral readmissions arrangements between Member 
States and authoritarian third states – Europe has pursued the de facto transfer of 
governance and risk to authorities with poor human rights records (Bialasiewicz 2011, 
2012; Cassarino et al 2010; Del Sarto 2015b; Paoletti 2010; Triandafyllidou 2013).5  
This pushing of the common refugee protection framework away from 
Europe, according to Gammeltoft-Hansen (2011, 146), has given rise to the ‘eclipse 
of a range of legal constraints’ and a new era of ‘protection-lite’. Andersson (2014) 
demonstrates how the exporting of the border in these ways cannot be dissociated 
from the extension of a market logic whereby authorities of third states in receipt of 
EU funding often then further sub-contract border control to private security 
companies and local militias who in turn profit from amplifying the perceived risk of 
‘irregular’ migration as a part of what he calls a cyclical industry. That European 
bordering practices not only occur at Europe’s territorial outer-edges means that EU 
citizens have been largely insulated from border-related violence legitimised in their 
name. Yet the distancing of Europe’s responsibility for the violent effects of attempts 
to police mobility beyond its territory has been challenged by NGOs and the United 
Nations (UN). A by-now considerable body of research points to systemic human 
rights abuses – particularly, though not exclusively, in the context of spaces of 
detention – and widespread allegations that the EU is seeking to wash its ‘dirty hands’ 
of a problem that it has had a role in creating as a (post)colonial power (Human 
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Rights Watch, 2011; see also Amnesty, 2013; Borderline Europe, 2013; Migreurop, 
2012; Pro Asyl, 2012a, 2012b, 2013). 
 
The Australian context 
Similar off-shore, out-sourced, and militarised border logics can be identified in the 
Australian context (Chambers, 2015, McMaster 2002, McDonald 2011). Australia has 
been a leading international innovator in developing extra-territorial border control 
governance practices – particularly in tackling the arrival of asylum-seekers to 
Australia by boat in the aftermath of the ‘Tampa Affair’ of 2001 (Fox 2013). Through 
the development of ‘Operation Relex’, Australia pursued a securitised approach to 
managing boat arrivals, by surveilling and intercepting boats, issuing warnings to 
crew, boarding vessels, and transporting passengers to approved regional areas 
(Howard 2003, 40-41, McKenzie and Hasmath 2013). This initiative was linked to the 
so-called ‘Pacific Solution’, involving the legislative authorisation of interdiction 
measures in international waters, a strengthened role for the military in border 
protection, provision for detention and processing of asylum-seekers at offshore 
locations, and legal excising of ‘particular territories, including Christmas, Cocos, and 
Ashmore and Cartier Islands, from the Australian “migration zone”’ (Mathew 2002, 
664). Though the Pacific Solution was dismantled in 2008, third country processing 
was reinstated in 2012 and mandatory immigration detention continues in locations 
such as Nauru and Manus Island.6 Furthermore, in 2013 the Australian Government 
established a Regional Settlement Arrangement with Papua New Guinea agreeing that 
asylum-seekers arriving unauthorised by boat would be transferred to PNG for 
processing and resettlement (AHRC 2013, 3-4).  
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As Anne McNevin (2015) has outlined, since the early 2000s extra-territorial 
efforts to contain flows of asylum-seekers from Indonesia in particular have sought to 
effectively insulate Australian territory from encounters with ‘irregular’ migrants. 
Paralleling Europe’s controversial mobility partnership scheme and bilateral 
agreements with third countries, the Australian government has outsourced border 
control in recent years so that it increasingly takes place 1000s of miles away in the 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore borderlands (McNevin 2015). The Indonesian 
island of Bintan is a case in point whereby the Australian government funds 
authorities there to intercept ‘irregular’ boats and push them back to the port of 
Tanjung Pinang where, upon disembarkation, they are held in an Australian-run 
detention centre (McNevin 2015). While, according to McNevin’s research, 
conditions at that centre are in many ways a model, the same cannot be said of similar 
facilities on the remote islands of Nauru, Manus Island, and Christmas Island: 
‘Islands are increasingly sites of sovereign experimentation in which territories, 
borders, and jurisdictions that trigger legal obligations to migrants of different kinds 
are deliberately rendered ambiguous’ (McNevin 2015: 302). 
In the Australian context then, there is a well-established and widely 
supported agenda around the offshoring of border control (Bleiker at al 2013). 
Support for this policy agenda was captured in the widely discussed political 
declaration – by Prime Minister John Howard in 2001 – that sovereign states have the 
right to determine ‘who will enter the country, and under what circumstances’ (Maley 
2009, 188). On the other hand, the measures have attracted strong opposition from 
others that regard them as politically illegitimate on a range of grounds, including: 
inadequate compliance with human rights standards, refugee conventions, and other 
provisions of international law; inadequate transparency in relation to offshore border 
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control operations, by both Australian military personnel and third party state and 
corporate delegates; and inadequate political accountability and democratic oversight 
for securitised and regionalised dimensions of border control practices (Fraser 2014).  
Up until this point however, despite the recognition of the securitization of 
these debates (McDonald 2011), relatively little attention has been paid in either 
European or Australian contexts to the ways in which these dynamics have become 
accompanied by and increasingly justified in the name of specifically humanitarian 
discourses. These discourses effectively subsume humanitarianism and the provisions 
of international law within a national security agenda that focuses on removing 
‘incentives’ for asylum seekers – by challenging people smugglers and disrupting 
their business model – and distracts attention from the root causes of people seeking 
asylum in the first place. Such discourses are what we refer to as an emergent 
transnational norm of compassionate borderwork. 
 
Transnational compassionate borderwork 
While the off-shoring, out-sourcing, and militarisation of border security has been 
widely commented upon in both European and Australian contexts, what has so far 
evaded extended critical commentary across the two is the parallel rise of the 
discourse of ‘humanitarian border security’. As Jill Williams (2015) has noted in the 
context of her work on the US-Mexico borderlands, most critical scholarship at the 
crossover between border, migration, and security studies has tended to focus on 
technologies of control and the discursive frameworks in which policies are framed 
and legitimised. To a large extent, however, while the entanglement between 
humanitarianism and security has a long history (Fassin 2012), the conjoining of 
‘border security’ with ‘humanitarian’ concerns for ‘irregular’ migrants and refugees is 
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itself a very recent policy development: ‘While humanitarianism has long been the 
handmaiden of imperialist and militarized interventions […] the humanitarianisation 
of borders and border enforcement is a relatively new phenomenon linked to the rise 
of more restrictive and violent enforcement regimes’ (Williams 2015: 14). Indeed, 
notwithstanding the longer history of humanitarian security politics, what Williams 
(2015) and a number of other border and migration scholars are starting to identify is 
the rise of humanitarian and care dimensions of contemporary border control regimes 
(see also Basaran 2015; Pallister-Wilkins 2015; Squire 2014, Author 2 self reference 
2015; Walters 2011).  
So far, however, the transnational dimension of this phenomenon, its temporal 
as well as spatial dimensions, and the broader implications both for critique and IR 
theorising in general have not, we suggest, been explored as fully as they might. 
Furthermore, an impasse has been reached whereby the framework for engaging 
critically with ‘humanitarian border security’ policies and practices that nevertheless 
expose ‘irregular’ migrant and refugee populations to dehumanising and lethal 
conditions is one that is reliant on pointing to a ‘gap’ between ‘humanitarian’ rhetoric 
and ‘national security’ realities on the ground (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013). This is 
potentially problematic because it is an argument that suggests that widespread human 
rights abuse would be preventable if only humanitarian border security policies were 
enacted rather than exploring the possibility that these policies perpetuate the very 
forms of violence that they purport to legislate against. 
 The intellectual backdrop for this emergent critical research agenda into 
humanitarian borders – to which the discussion will shortly return – is that of a 
broader interdisciplinary current of scholarship – typically associated with in-depth 
political anthropological studies – that has sought to problematise broader 
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humanitarian logics of government and the performative work that they do in 
contemporary global politics. In this context, Didier Fassin’s (2012) work on 
‘humanitarian reason’ as a particular moral economy that enjoins ‘us’ to ‘help’ and/or 
‘save’ ‘them’ is of crucial importance. Rooted in the Christian tradition of empathy 
and the abolitionist movement of the eighteenth century in France, the UK, and the 
US, Fassin argues that humanitarianism is a mode of governing otherwise ‘threatened 
and forgotten lives’, which encompasses a set of procedures and actions designed to 
‘manage, regulate, and support the existence of human beings’ (Fassin 2012, 1).  
Fassin’s research considers the effects of humanitarian reason, the political 
dimension of its affective capability, and the blind spots and dilemmas that it gives 
rise to, and serves as a reminder that the intertwining of humanitarian and securitizing 
logics is not a new phenomenon. In the case of recent immigration in France he 
argues that the shift in the 1990s from struggles over political asylum to the 
humanitarian language of compassion constituted an important political moment 
whereby the body of the undesirable ‘irregular’ subject—‘the primary site on which 
the imprint of power is stamped’ — was removed from public life and given shelter in 
camps such as Sangatte (Fassin 2012, 112). In this way, humanitarianism and 
securitization, compassion and repression, hospitality and hostility are not, he argues, 
straightforwardly in contradiction with each other. Rather, Fassin stresses, these 
seemingly contradictory elements must be seen as being inextricably intertwined as 
part of the same terrain and logic of what Foucault (1998) paradigmatically referred to 
as biopolitical modes of governance.  
Foucault used the concept of biopolitics to refer to a specifically modern way 
of exercising power characterised by a politics of caring for and maximising life. He 
argued that from the eighteenth century onward new forms of scientific knowledge 
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emerged in Europe – made possible by disciplines such as statistics, demography, 
epidemiology, and biology – and that this knowledge brought biological life (zoē) into 
the modalities of state power (bios). Whereas sovereign power referred to taking life 
or letting life live at the level of the individual, bio-power, he argued, focuses on 
regulation and intervention in order to enhance the population as a whole. On the one 
hand, Fassin argues that humanitarian action constitutes a form of biopolitical 
intervention inasmuch as it ‘uses techniques of the management of populations in 
setting up refugee camps, establishing aid corridors, making use of communication 
around public testimony to abuses perpetrated, and conducting epidemiological 
studies of infectious diseases, malnutrition, trauma, and even violations of the laws of 
war’ (Fassin 2012, 226). On the other hand, however, Fassin argues that 
humanitarianism is in another sense distinct from biopolitics because the former is 
primarily about saving individual lives, ‘which presupposes not only risking others 
but also selecting those that have priority for being saved’ (Fassin 2012, 226). It is 
because humanitarianism ‘qualifies and measures the value and worth of lives’ that 
Fassin sees it as being in tension with Foucault’s biopolitical emphasis on the 
optimisation and regulation of the population as a whole (Fassin 2010, 242).  
The question of how biopolitical attempts to maximise life relate to the 
widespread negation of life under contemporary biopolitical conditions is precisely 
what is at stake in any attempt to diagnose the phenomenon of humanitarian border 
security and yet the extant literature highlights the limits of the Foucaultian frame. In 
his seminal piece, William Walters (2011) argued that the dynamics to which Fassin 
refers as instances of humanitarian reason have started to manifest themselves in the 
context of a range of border sites globally. Walters calls this trend ‘the birth of the 
humanitarian border’, which he identifies as the corollary of the kind of punitive, 
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violent, and militarised bordering practices explored in the European and Australian 
contexts above: in this sense the fusing of humanitarianism with border security is a 
method of ‘compensating for the social violence embodied in the regime of migration 
control’ (Walters 2011: 139). For Walters, the humanitarian border is a zone located 
at the outer-edge of sovereign territory whereby diverse biopolitical efforts to 
maintain the physical existence of ‘irregular’ populations at a bare minimum creates 
opportunities for a range of actors to (re)produce their political agency. Walters’ study 
focuses on the European context and the role that NGOs play in supporting vulnerable 
groups in ways that ‘problematize the border as a site of suffering, violence and death, 
and a political zone of injustice and oppression’ (Walters 2011: 150). As such, for 
Walters the notion of the humanitarian border is associated with a ‘positive’ reading 
of biopolitics, as found in Foucault’s paradigmatic account. 
 By contrast, Jill Williams puts forward a subtly different reading of 
humanitarian borderwork as one characterised by fundamental ambivalence. 
Responding to Walters’ call for further research into the phenomenon of humanitarian 
bordering, Williams (2015) argues that in the case of the US-Mexico borderlands it is 
not only NGOs that engage in practices of care, but other borderwork actors including 
states and their proxies. Moreover, in contradistinction with Miriam Ticktin’s (2011) 
argument that this kind of care represents a form of ‘humanitarian exceptionalism’ – 
whereby sympathy and succor is shown only to a small number of ‘irregular’ migrants 
in order to further reinforce more widespread forms of exclusion – Williams draws 
attention to the move on behalf of the state to embrace humanitarian bordering logics 
as a form of biopolitical governmentality. On this view, and to some extent departing 
from Fassin’s and Walters’ accounts, care and enforcement are not antithetical to, but 
rather go hand in hand with, the violent effects of compassionate borderwork as a 
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biopolitical technology of power because the humanitarian rhetoric and practice reach 
extends states’ abilities to govern subjects (e.g. unknown ‘irregular’ migrants), spaces 
(e.g. sites such as hospitals), and – we would wish to add – times (e.g. moments of 
extreme crisis) in ways that were otherwise hitherto impossible.  
In the discussion that follows, we demonstrate that the fundamental 
ambivalence to which Williams extends beyond the confines of the borderlands of 
Southern Arizona and argue that it is reflective of an emergent mode of biopolitical 
governance transnationally. Such ambivalence permeates contemporary discourses 
and practices of compassionate borderwork in both European and Australian contexts, 
which illustrate the way in which biopolitical regimes of care at the border also work 
to exclude and often with lethal consequences. In order to further conceptualise what 
is at stake in these contradictory dynamics we ultimately turn to the work of Roberto 
Esposito and find promise in his concept of (auto)immunity for supplementing the 
dominant Foucaultian paradigm with a means for understanding how compassionate 
borderwork has the innate capacity to both save and kill the same lives.  
 
Policy responses to the 2015 Mediterranean crisis 
Echoing responses to the 2013 Lampedusa incidents, EU elites commonly framed 
their reactions to the deaths of ‘irregular’ migrants and refugees in the Mediterranean 
in 2015 with a confusing blend of the language of border security and humanitarian 
protection: this dynamic has evolved dramatically over the course of the ‘crisis’ such 
that the two are now indistinguishable in the official policy grammars of the EU 
Commission.  
Initially these dynamics were evident in the ‘Ten Point Action Plan on 
Migration’ issued by the Joint Foreign and Home Affairs Council of the EU 
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Commission (2015c). Interspersed with humanitarian references to ‘the dire situation 
in the Mediterranean’ and the imperative to act immediately in order to ‘make a 
difference’, the content of the Action Plan focused on short-term securitised and 
military-based responses. Thus, alongside the commitment to an ‘EU wide voluntary 
pilot project on resettlement, offering a number of places to persons in need of 
protection’, the Plan also referred to the reinforcement of Joint Frontex Operations 
Triton and Poseidon; the commitment to ‘capture and destroy vessels used by the 
smugglers’; the ‘fingerprinting of all migrants’; and a ‘new return programme for 
rapid return of irregular migrants coordinated by Frontex from frontline Member 
States’ (EU Commission 2015).  
Similarly, in a statement following its Special Meeting of 23 April, the 
European Council declared the situation in the Mediterranean a ‘human emergency’ 
and stated ‘Our immediate priority is to prevent more people from dying at sea’ 
(European Council 2015). The statement continued by emphasising the security-based 
measures through which this humanitarian mission will be achieved: ‘We have 
therefore decided to strengthen our presence at sea, to fight the traffickers, to prevent 
illegal migration flows and to reinforce internal solidarity and responsibility’ 
(European Council 2015). Though short of a direct embrace of Abbott’s ‘stop the 
boats’ mantra, the Council vowed to ‘undertake systematic efforts to identify, capture 
and destroy vessels before they are used by traffickers’ thereby paving the way for 
EU military intervention on the coast of North Africa (European Council 2015). 
 Three weeks later, on 13 May, the European Commission unveiled its long-
awaited ‘European Agenda on Migration’, which promised to establish a new 
framework for border security and migration management in Europe. Beginning with 
the truism that ‘every person’s migration tells its own story’, the document draws 
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heavily on the affective language of the ‘plight’ and ‘human misery’ of ‘vulnerable’ 
migrants, the ‘peril’ that they put their lives in to cross the Mediterranean, and the 
‘shock’ expressed by Europeans at the sight of their arrival – dead or alive. At the 
same time, the repeated goal of ‘saving lives’ was again accompanied with multiple 
references to the need for enhanced border security, the targeting of traffickers and 
smugglers (the two, while distinct, are sometimes used interchangeably) and 
‘irregular’ migrants alike, and the invocation of emergency legislation to help 
Member States ‘confronted with a sudden influx of migrants’ under Article 78(3) of 
the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (EU Commission 2015, 
emphasis added). With the announcement of a tripling of the funding of FRONTEX, 
the dual role of that agency was underscored as ‘coordinating operational border 
support to Member States under pressure’ and to ‘helping to save the lives of migrants 
at sea’ (EU Commission 2015: 3).  
 Against the backdrop of monthly sea arrivals in Europe rising rapidly from 
just under 50,000 in May to their peak of nearly 250,000 in October (UNHCR 2015), 
the EU Commission issued a further priority action plan in order to set out both short 
and long term measures (EU Commission 2015d). This document claimed that the 
impact of FRONTEX Joint Operations Poseidon and Triton had already saved ‘over 
122,000 lives’ and commented that ‘Every life lost is one too many, but many more 
have been rescued that would have been lost otherwise – and increase of 250%’ (EU 
Commission 2015d: 3). Alongside other achievements since May – listed as action 
against smugglers choking off the supply of ‘rickety, unseaworthy boats’, the 
relocation of 160,000 people ‘in need of international protection’, and €3.9 billion in 
aid to Syrians and host communities in Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Turkey, and Egypt – 
the plan once again emplaces these humanitarian moves within a broader logic of 
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‘strong border control’ (EU Commission 2015d: 4). However, what is striking about 
this document is the absence of the militarised language of the initial ‘Ten Point Plan’ 
and a notable dilution of security as a framework for managing the ‘crisis’: border 
control in this new phase is framed almost exclusively via a logic of compassionate 
borderwork.  
 To a large extent the EU Commission’s response to the 2015 Mediterranean 
crisis represents a continuation and further intensification of the discourse of 
humanitarian border security first evident in the Commission’s 2011 ‘Global 
Approach to Migration and Mobility’ (GAMM). Moving away from traditional statist 
paradigms, the renewed GAMM called for a ‘migrant-centred’ approach to border 
security and migration management (EU Commission 2011a, 6). A particular feature 
of the GAMM is its catchall focus on the human rights, safety, and well-being of each 
individual migrant rather than on formal juridical-political categories of migrants: ‘In 
essence, migration governance is not about “flows”, “stocks”, and “routes”, it is about 
people’ (EU Commission 2011a, 6, emphasis added). While the GAMM emphasises 
the particular need to protect ‘vulnerable’ migrants, it refers more generally to 
mainstreaming democratic principles and human rights for all migrants as human 
beings irrespective of their origin, destination or ‘legal status’ and gives a special 
emphasis on empowerment via access to information (EU Commission 2011e, 14, 
emphasis added). 
 However, what marks the response to the 2015 Mediterranean crisis as 
distinctive in the evolution of EU border security and migration management is the 
folding of militarised options with the discourse of humanitarian border security in 
the first phase and then the move to subsume all elements of border security under the 
rubric of humanitarian aid in the second. In this regard, the EU’s particular focus on 
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‘smugglers’ is an important innovation – mirroring the Australian case – which 
simultaneously shifts attention for the ‘cause’ of the ‘crisis’ away from both 
‘irregular’ migrants and refugees seeking a better life and the longer-term role played 
by restrictive EU border security and migration policies. Through this distancing and 
displacement, furthermore, the strong emphasis on the ‘smuggler’ as a third party – as 
reflected in the ‘European Migration Agenda’ and the ‘EU Action Plan against 
migration smuggling 2015-2020’ (EU Commission 2015e) – has created new 
opportunities for the justification of possible military action in a way that would 
otherwise attract international condemnation.  
Aside from the obvious difficulties of identifying and distinguishing between 
‘smugglers’ and ‘irregular’ migrants and refugees and the inherent dangers that this 
poses, the EU Commission’s response fails to recognise that the creation of markets 
for smuggling have in part been stimulated by the EU’s historic closure of ‘regular’ 
channels for migration since the early 1990s. As such, the reproblematisation of the 
problem as being essentially one of criminality – rather than as an outcome of 
repressive border security and migration policy and longer-term structural inequalities 
– depoliticises the broader political context in which the crisis can be located and 
understood. Furthermore, the invocation of an exceptionalist discourse of 
‘emergency’ permits military solutions married with new forms of compassionate 
borderwork as an emerging framework to deal with a range of problems associated 
with populations perceived to be ungoverned. Thus, in his remarks of 14 April, Vice-
President Commissioner Avramopoulos said: ‘Europe finds itself amidst a widening 
arc of instability from the East all the way to North Africa […] The unprecedented 
influx of migrants at our borders […] is unfortunately the new norm and we will need 
to adjust our responses accordingly’ (EU Commission 2015b).  
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What we are seeing in this context, therefore, is akin to what Ticktin (2011: 5) 
has referred to as ‘armed love’ whereby ‘brutal measures may accompany actions in 
the name of care and rescue – measures that ultimately work to reinforce an 
oppressive order’. In a modification of the kind of humanitarian exception referred to 
by Ticktin in her study of the French state (2011), however, what we witness in the 
EU’s response to the 2015 crisis is more akin to a generalised exception associated 
with compassionate borderwork: the emergence of a form of governmentality, which 
interpellates the ‘irregular’ migrant as the ‘victim’, the smuggler as the ‘perpetrator’, 
and the EU as the ‘saviour’. Furthermore, as we shall go on to see in the context of 
our second case study in the Australian context, this logic of the compassionate 
border is not irreducible to contemporary European border politics, but is arguably an 
emerging transnational form of governmentality. 
 
The Gillian Triggs case 
One recent Australian case that exemplifies the dynamics discussed in the first section 
of this article is the furore in February 2015 around the publication of the Australian 
Human Rights Commission Report (AHRC) on The Forgotten Children: National 
Inquiry into Children in Immigration Detention 2014 (AHRC 2014). The AHRC 
Report had two key aims. First, it was designed to ‘assess the impact of prolonged 
immigration detention on children’s health, wellbeing and development’. Second, it 
wanted to ‘promote compliance with Australia’s international obligations to act in the 
best interests of children’ (AHRC 2014: 11). In so doing, the Report was repeatedly 
critical of both Labor and Coalition governments in Australia because of the evidence 
presented that the detention of children had ‘serious negative impacts on their mental 
and emotional health and development’: 
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It is … clear that the laws, policies and practices of Labor and Coalition 
Governments are in serious breach of the rights guaranteed by the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
also suggests in his opening address to the Human Rights Council that 
Australia’s policy of offshore processing and boat turn backs is ‘leading to a 
chain of human rights violations, including arbitrary detention and possible 
torture following return to home countries’. (AHRC 2014: 12) 
 
The publication of the Report sparked a highly contentious debate that focused 
on the role of the AHRC, the political leanings of its President, Gillian Triggs, the 
demands for her resignation from members of the Federal Coalition government and 
the media, and the differences in immigration and detention policy between the 
government and the previous Labor administrations between 2007 and 2013. The 
primary assumption underpinning the claims of the critics of Triggs was that the 
timing of the release of the report was deliberate and intended to undermine the 
Coalition government, which had been claiming the success of its ‘Stop the Boats’ 
mantra and its implementation through Operation Sovereign Borders. The ensuing 
political furore concentrated on the question of whether Triggs should resign (or 
whether she had been offered any inducement to do so) and the fact that the number 
of children being held in immigration detention camps was lower under the Coalition 
administration than had been the case under ALP governments.  
 In the Report, however, Triggs suggests that the number of children in 
detention in July 2013 (under the Rudd ALP administration) was sufficient for her to 
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exercise the Commission’s powers to hold an inquiry. However, she waited until the 
outcome of the September 2013 federal election was known and, on the basis of the 
‘relatively stable’ number of children remaining in detention over the first six months 
of the new Coalition government, decided to press ahead with the investigation. As 
we now know, this decision was pivotal to the ensuing controversy but, given both 
governments were subsequently chastised, it seems pertinent to note that the 
investigation was focused on the impact of the detention of children on their health 
rather than whether one set of policies that detained children was better than another. 
Indeed, there is implicit recognition in the document that Operation Sovereign 
Borders ‘has prevented asylum seekers from reaching our shores’ thereby enabling 
the AHRC to focus on the 5514 asylum seekers detained on Nauru and Manus Island 
at 30 September, 2014 (AHRC 2014: 12). In other words, the focus on the impact on 
children’s health and well-being was directed towards a group of people who were 
largely detained under an ALP administration rather than the Coalition government 
when the Report was published. This is even more explicit when Triggs states that as 
‘the arrival of asylum seeker children by sea without visas has ended for the moment, 
it is time to refocus on the plight of the 800 children who remain in Australian 
detention centres and on Nauru’ (AHRC 2014:  17). 
 Moreover, the Report also identifies a number of policy changes by the 
Coalition government with regard to children in detention after February 2014 which 
had alleviated the situation of some asylum seeker children (AHRC 2014: 15). 
Obviously, however, the recommendations of the Report were directed towards the 
government of the day in dealing with the remaining children detained at the point of 
publication but also those who had previously been detained under various mandatory 
detention policies since those first enacted by an ALP government in 1992 and 
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continued thereafter by governments of both complexions. Triggs also states that it is 
the policies enacted by the Gillard ALP government in August 2012 and the second 
Rudd ALP administration in July 2013 (as well as their maintenance in the first six 
months of the Abbott Coalition government) to suspend processing of asylum seekers 
who arrived by boat that was increasing the duration that asylum seekers (including 
children) were spending in detention in addition to the 128 children who were born in 
detention centres between January 2013 and March 2014 (AHRC 2014: 20). 
 In effect, the debate that ensued enabled the government to reiterate their 
rhetoric that they had stopped the boats and reduced the number of asylum seekers 
reaching Australian shores, while critics of the government pointed to the inhumane 
conditions in the Christmas Island, Nauru and mainland detention centres, the 
immorality of holding children in detention at all (regardless of the number involved), 
and the fact that the hardline Australian policy was having ramifications in other 
countries in the region – particularly Indonesia (Toohey 2014). However, buried 
within this debate and the regular political posturing which accompanied much of it, 
was a much more subtle point which exemplifies the concerns articulated in the first 
half of this article. In a standard piece of vitriol directed at ‘compassionistas’, and 
amid numerous other assertions about queue-jumping and chaos in the immigration 
system, the journalist Chris Kenny noted ‘the need for a strong regime to prevent life-
threatening voyages’. Indeed, he urged the need for ‘tough measures restoring order, 
preventing tragedy and ensuring fairness in our generous immigration system’ (Kenny 
2015). 
 It is this latter point rather than the more general commotion about the rights 
and wrongs of the Triggs Report that are significant for our purposes here. Very few 
people in the discussion about the detention of children were suggesting that it was a 
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good situation. However, where the AHRC Report was designed to draw attention to 
the human rights, health and well-being of children in detention and therefore the 
humanitarian case for their release, the points being made by both the Federal 
government and their supporters in the media was that the Coalition elected in 2013 
was being more humanitarian through the implementation of Operation Sovereign 
Borders. Therefore, according to this narrative, by stopping the boats, the government 
was preventing potential immigrants from arriving on Australian territory and 
therefore ensuring more humanitarian outcomes than would otherwise be the case if 
their critics were in government. In other words, border security policy designed to 
ensure outsiders did not arrive in Australia (and their subsequent offshore detention in 
unsavoury conditions) was having the effect of being humanitarian and therefore 
guaranteeing the common human rights of all were being better protected. It was a 
classic fusion of security and humanitarian discourses predicated, of course, on the 
primacy of security policy. The government were committed to the hardline border 
security policy and a narrative of ‘control’ anyway (McKenzie and Hasmath 2013) 
but had managed to articulate a humanitarian rhetoric within this policy agenda.  
 This manoeuvre involved shifting the focus of humanitarianism from a 
concern with the circumstances that asylum seekers have endured to one focused on 
how they will be treated in their status as potential immigrants. Therefore, rather than 
concentrating attention on the conditions which gave rise to migrants travelling to 
Australia in the first place, the focus turned to the dangers that people experienced in 
transit. And, indeed, the process of arriving in Australian territory became the focus 
of humanitarian discussions rather than the conditions that would be experienced on 
arrival and their long-term impact on health (which was the major focus of the AHRC 
Report). These conditions were much more problematic and complicated in 
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humanitarian debates than the rhetoric of the ‘stop the boats’ agenda permitted 
(Bleiker at al 2013).  
 In the words of the AHRC Report, ‘locked detention environments harm 
children, and children need to be removed from these environments as soon as 
possible. This is an urgent requirement for the health and wellbeing of these children’ 
(AHRC 2014: 22). Evidently, the key focus of the Report was the inhumane treatment 
of children in detention once they had arrived in Australian territory. The 
humanitarian argument was based on universal human rights and the specific 
conventions on the treatment of children in international law and was therefore 
focused on children who had already made it as far as Australian detention centres. 
Both major political parties in Australia had already admitted that the detention of 
children was not a deterrent to asylum seekers in the first place (AHRC 2014: 21). 
Thus, within one example, we witness a twofold movement that subsumes universal, 
humanitarian concerns within a narrow security focus on border protection. First, the 
agenda became focused on the conditions that people face once they were already part 
of the asylum-seeking process rather than the conditions they were seeking to escape. 
Second, in focusing on the process and means of arrival, the policy of managing 
arrivals – and its potential inhumanity – was being shrouded by security concerns and 
their inside/outside dynamic. In effect, a rather traditional security agenda focused on 
distinguishing between insider and outsider was operating in a discursive manner to 
subsume a broader universal and humanitarian concern with human rights.   
 
Conclusion 
The increasing entanglement of logics of securitization and humanitarianism in the 
context of European and Australian border and migration management is we argue 
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symptomatic of the emergence of a transnational governmental logic of 
compassionate borderwork. This is fast becoming a discourse with considerable 
policy traction, which, as the case studies of responses to the 2015 Mediterranean 
‘crisis’ and the Gillian Triggs affair indicate, provides a script for the production of 
knowledge about and governance of ‘irregular’ populations globally. Perhaps one of 
the reasons for the appeal of this discourse among authorities responsible for border 
security is that it outflanks traditional grounds on which border-related violence might 
be held to account. By coopting the empathetic language of solidarity with ‘irregular’ 
migrants and refugees and insisting on them as ‘individuals’ whose rights must be 
respected and lives empowered it is a discourse that takes away humanitarianism as 
the basis for critique of border security practices that otherwise expose those 
populations to violent methods of exclusion – the dominant method through which 
critical scholars, NGOs, and ‘irregular’ migrant and refugee communities have 
hitherto framed their response.  
 In seeking an alternative strategy for critical engagement therefore we suggest 
that it is more effective to think about what humanitarian borderwork does as a logic 
of governmentality and performative political practice. What is important in this 
regard is to note that the form of political subjectivity produced is one that is taken 
outside of space and time and rendered effectively context-less. The ‘irregular’ 
migrant in need of saving by border security authorities is one that is not only denied 
any political agency, but also devoid of any connectivity with wider social relations. 
Excepted from the historical conditions that have led to such situations of emergency, 
she or he is treated as a biological life not a biographical life (Fassin 2012) – a subject 
who is positioned as being entirely dependent upon the salvation of the authority that 
promises to save her. Moreover, this instantiates an inescapable economy of violence 
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through which – via acts of succor – authorities seek to (re)authorise their authority in 
the absence of any prior foundation.  
 For these reasons, despite its universalist pretensions, acts of compassionate 
borderwork draw lines precisely by producing ‘irregular’ populations in need of 
saving and thus therapeutic intervention. Such acts not only secure dominant 
understandings of which populations count as ‘regular’ citizen-subjects, but also 
create new opportunities for knowledge generation about otherwise unknown – and 
therefore ungovernable – ‘irregular’ populations of migrants and refugees. Hence, the 
transnational humanitarian border is a biopolitical technology of security par 
excellence because it secures subjects who are deemed to be potentially risky from 
becoming dangerous (Dillon 2001). While IR scholarship has considered several of 
these dynamics in the contexts of humanitarian aid and intervention, security and 
counter-terrorism, and older colonial logics of surveillance and control, the 
transnational phenomenon of compassionate borderwork brings them together via 
biopolitical techniques that we have only begun to render visible and with political 
and ethical implications that will demand ever closer critical scrutiny. Furthermore, 
new diagnostic tools are required that move beyond the present impasse in the extant 
critical literatures. 
 Both case studies explored here illustrate that compassionate borderwork is a 
biopolitical technology of power that is not straightforwardly ‘positive’ – in other 
words designed to maximise and optimise life as per the Foucaultian paradigm – and 
yet neither can it be considered simply ‘negative’ or thanatopolitical in orientation as 
associated with certain readings of Giorgio Agamben’s (1998) treatment of 
biopolitics. The humanitarian mantra to ‘stop the boats!’ using military methods 
targeted at smugglers is politically and ethically ambivalent in both European and 
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Australian contexts and hence a supplement is required in order to move beyond 
critiques of humanitarian border security that either simply blame a gap between 
rhetoric and reality or those that oscillate between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ readings 
of biopolitical forms of governmentality.  
At stake is the question posed by Roberto Esposito (2008), namely: why does 
biopower have the capacity to kill if it is animated by and motivated to protect and 
preserve life? For Esposito (2008, 2011, 2013) the ‘positive’ dimension of biopolitics 
is not antithetical to the ‘negative’ propensity towards exclusion and death. Rather, 
Esposito argues that neither the protection nor the negation of life can be given 
ontological primacy in accounts of biopolitical forms of governance. Rather, in 
Esposito’s account, biopolitics pulls simultaneously in these two opposing directions 
and the missing link in both Foucault’s work and others’ inspired by it is the concept 
of immunisation.7 Esposito argues that the need to protect life is not a new societal 
phenomenon, but that the need to preserve and optimise life was not central to ancient 
and medieval societies. What changed under specifically modern conditions was that 
the weakening of ‘the great chain of being’ created the need for alternative methods 
of self-protection. In this context, Esposito (2011) traces the emergence of the concept 
of immunity in both juridical-political and bio-medical traditions of thought as 
referring to a ‘protective response in the face of a risk’. The logic of immunisation 
works by using precisely that which it seeks to oppose in order to develop a resistance 
against it. But while in non-lethal doses this operation may protect life, beyond a 
certain threshold Esposito argues that it may threaten that which it is supposed to 
protect, which may in turn lead to an autoimmune crisis. 
For Esposito it is precisely in the potential for such an autoimmune disorder 
that the ambivalent potential of biopolitical governance ultimately lies. While Nazism 
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represented the zenith of the historical realisation of ‘negative’ biopolitics, its passing 
did not mean the end of that potentiality. The logic of autoimmunity has not 
disappeared, according to Esposito, and he warns against symptoms of excessive 
immunitary defence in global politics today: for example, the neurotic drive to 
simulate maximal security by Western governments in the context of the war against 
terrorism. Rethought in the light of Esposito’s diagnosis compassionate borderwork is 
a discourse that operates according to an (auto)immunitary logic: the very lives that 
are identified as in need of protecting and saving can also become targeted by 
excessive, aggressively militaristic, and ultimately lethal apparatuses of security. 
Nowhere is this paradoxical logic more visibly at play in the field of contemporary 
border security relations than when ‘irregular’ migrants and refugees in distress are 
unsure as to whether governmental actors claiming to ‘stop the boats’ are doing so to 
protect or abandon them – or both. 
 
1 In this paper we follow the convention of referring to ‘irregularity’ in inverted commas 
throughout in order to denaturalise this category as a contingent subject position (see Squire 
2011). 
2 Abbott was deposed as Prime Minister in September 2015 by Malcolm Turnbull. 
3 Abbott’s successor, Malcolm Turnbull, also pointed to the success of the ‘Stop the Boats’ 
policy on his appointment as Prime Minister (see http://www.theguardian.com/australia-
news/2015/sep/15/after-winning-his-prize-malcolm-turnbull-must-learn-from-abbotts-
mistakes). Meanwhile, Abbott has continued to champion the policy since he lost office (see 
http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/tony-abbott-urges-europe-to-adopt-
boat-turnbacks-in-response-to-refugee-crisis-20151027-gkk6z9.html). 
4 By ‘governmentality’ we draw here on the established Foucaultian concept to refer to ‘a 
range of forms of action and fields of practice aimed in a complex way at steering individuals 
and collectives’ (Bröckling et al 2010: 1).  
5 It is worth noting here that historic bilateral agreements between EU Member States and 
authoritarian and corrupt third states – e.g. between Spain-Morocco and Italy-Libya – pre-
date these developments at EU level. With thanks to an anonymous peer reviewer for making 
this point. 
6 In April 2016, Papua New Guinea’s Supreme Court ruled that Australia’s detention of 
asylum seekers on Manus Island is illegal because it breaches the right to personal liberty in 
the PNG constitution. See 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-04-26/png-court-rules-asylum-seeker-detention-manus-
island-illegal/7360078. 
7 For a fuller exegesis of the work of Esposito see (author 2 self-reference). 
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